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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Perhaps the single most enouring theme in economics is that 
I 
of the social desirability of the competitive mechanism. In its modern 
form, this theme occurs as the two basic theorems of welfare economics 
(see, in particular, Arrow [l]) . Our central concern in this paper is 
with the validity of the first of these two theorems -- that every 
competitive equilibrium yields a Pareto optimal allocation in 
idealized yet plausible models of intertemporal allocation in a market 
economy. 
What is especially striking about the posture of the 
"invisible hand" is its apparent widespread reach; all that seems to 
be required in the well-known standard argument is that there be 
neither real externalities (in consumption and production) nor local 
satiation (in consumption). This is very misleading -- quite aside 
from any questions of the existence of competitive equilibrium. One 
of the most important features of the maintained assumptions in that 
argument is that they implicitly impose some element of boundedness in 
order to offset the intrinsic one-directional, open-ended nature of 
time. In the commonly accepted paradigm, this element is simply 
imposed by postulating a bounded horizon (see, for example, Arrow-Hahn 
[2]) . In another frequently recurring extension, it is effectively 
imposed by postulating the alternative -- and equally implausible --
assumption that there are essentially a finite number of infinitely-
lived agents (see, for example, Debreu [5] ) .  In any case, it is not 
necessarily true that the "invisible hand" stretches over ecbn 
whose evolution extends towards an unbounded horizon -- eveJ i 
most favorable of circumstances otherwise. I 
This significant exception was first recognized, jt 
implicitly, in Malinvaud's classic paper on capital theory [8] 
However, it only received its first explicit elaboration in Isa· 
equally celebrated seminal contribution [10]. Samuelson's �is 
is the starting point for our own. 
mies 
the 
east 
uels 
ussi 
Samuelson showed that -- in a simple model of a market 
economy characterized by an unbounded horizon, short-lived, lov!rlap 
but essentially identical households and a single, perishab]e. hysil 
commodity -- without some extra-market institution, there mJy be n 
competitive·equilibrium which is Pareto optimal. He also sJowed t
one natural extra-market institution which may set matters Jrikht i 
fiat money initially owned (i. e. , cleverly invented) by the lfitst 
generation of households, and subsequently purchased with ptiys[cal. 
commodities (i. e. , expressly valued) by each succeeding genlration 
I 
provided only that money trades for commodities at a sufficien�ly 
(present value) price. A number of others have since refinjd and 
extended Samuelson's central argument (see, for example, caJs�Uaar� 
[3], Diamond [6], Gale [7], Shell [11] and Starrett [14]) .
Even on his own grounds Samuelson dealt with a special c 
(boundary endowments) in a special way (stationary allocatilns
Expanding his analysis -- much in the manner of Gale, but iJ d[ffeu 
I 
spirit -- it is easy to show that in Samuelson's basic model (with 
two-period lifetimes) there is the following dichotomy: Wilhout mo 
s 
g 
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the competitive equilibrium is the initial endowment allocation itself, 
which may be Pareto optimal or not. Furthermore, upon the introduction 
of money, in the former case nothing is altered. The price of money 
must be zero and the allocation is again the initial endowments (in 
this instance, Pareto optimal). In the latter case, however, there 
now exists a continuum of potential competitive equilibria. Considering 
just the least complicated possibility, these range from the original 
autarkic equilibrium -- where the price of money turns out to be zero and 
the allocation is once again the initial endowments (in this instance, 
not Pareto optimal) -- to the "fully" monetized equilibrium -- where 
the price of money is at a maximum and the allocation turns out to be 
both stationary and Pareto optimal. In the intermediate range -- that 
of the "partly" monetized equilibria the price of money is positive, 
but the allocations are neither stationary nor Pareto optimal. In 
fact, in the "partly" monetized equilibria, the allocation must be 
asymptotically the same as in the original autarkic equilibrium. 
Thus, a complete analysis of Samuelson's basic model (now 
including consideration of more complicated possibilities for 
nonstationary equilibria) leads to several very strong conclusions. 
These can be summarized, in somewhat general fashion, by the following 
propositions: Consider the range of potential competitive equilibria 
with money, and call an equilibrium barter if the price of money is 
zero, monetary if it's positive. Then we have 
Existence Proposition: There is a monetary equilibrium if and only 
if there is no barter equilibrium which is Pareto optimal. 
Optimality Proposition: If there is a monetary equilibrium,! then 
is also a monetary equilibrium which is Pareto optimal. 
Note, in particular, that both propositions together imply tlhat the 
is always some competitive equilibrium (barter or monetary) lwhach · 
Pareto optimal. 
The central issue we address in this paper is how lrobust 
these propositions (and their related implications) are to var[ous 
generalizations of Samuelson's basic model, and especially Jo 
I the assumption that all households are essentially identical ca.e. 
have the same tastes for and endowments of physical commodijie 
for date of birth). 
It would hardly be surprising if such relaxation �eq 
some qualification or modification of the propositions. 
to 
at 
surprising, however, that with the introduction of what amount 
fairly routine variety in tastes and endowments -- judged bJ t 
typically encountered in general equilibrium theory -- neit�eri 
proposition survives in any recognizable form. SpecificallJ, Me 
I 
that the consumption-loan model with heterogeneous households (and,: 
upon occasion, other extensions) yields the following sorts I ofl 
counterexamples: 
Coexistence Example: There are both barter and monetary eqtiiliibri 
which are Pareto optimal. 
Nonoptimality Example: There are both barter and monetary $quilib 
but none which is Pareto optimal. 
e 
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While there is some degree of speciality to our examples, especially 
those exhibiting "nonoptimality", this seems dictated more by our 
maintained simplifying assumptions -- that there is effectively just 
a single common good (though perhaps more than one physical commodity) 
in each period, and that each household survives at most two periods --
than by any inherent feature of the issues involved. 
The significance of the coexistence examples may not be 
immediately apparent. But, in fact they do carry an important message. 
On the one hand, these examples clearly demonstrate that there is no 
observable criterion for determining whether the existence of fiat 
money as a store of value is necessary to support the Pareto optimality 
of competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, much more critically, 
they graphically illustrate one basic difficulty encountered in 
assigning a normative role to fiat money -- the wide extent of 
nonuniqueness of monetary equilibrium: Even when the presence of money 
(trading for commodities at some suitable positive price) can surely 
guarantee the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibrum, the 
competitive mechanism by itself offers no assurance whatsoever that 
it will. Indeed, our coexistence examples strongly suggest that --
in general -- something like continuous monitoring of the price level 
may be an indispensable component of an otherwise neutral monetary 
(or more accurately, fiscal) policy. 
It is the nonexistence examples, however, which convey the 
central message we have to communicate. These examples dramatically 
highlight a second, even more fundamental difficulty with relying on 
the mere creation of fiat money to conjure up an effective appeal to 
the second basic theorem of welfare economics the limitedl s¢ope 
once-and-for-all augmentation of initial wealth: Just the pfe$ence 
of money (trading for commodities at any conceivable positile �rice 
may possibly not guarantee the Pareto optimality of competitive 
equilibrium. Indeed, our nonoptimality examples strongly supg$st t
-- in general -- something like continuous redistribution bYi means 
 creation (or destruction) of fiat money may be an indispensabl! 
lubricant for the efficient o eration of an evolvin market �c nom 
The plan of the paper is as follows: A partially lge eral
consumption-loan model is described in Section II. Section 
I
II! con
a review of the leading special case, Samuelson's basic mode�. I The 
core examples, exhibiting the coexistence of both barter andl m@neta 
equilibria which are Pareto optimal, and the nonexistence of[ a*y 
competitive equilibrium which is Pareto optimal, are presentfd l in 
Sections IV and V, respectively. Finally, the Appendix contai�s so 
technical results we require involving the construction of o�fer 
curves (or equivalently, indifference maps) exhibiting variols1spec 
properties. 
II. THE BASIC MODEL 
The economy begins operation in period 1, and cont�n�es 
over periods extending indefinitely into the future t = 1,2,, • .  
In each period there are two commodities, one a perishable ppy$ical 
good (whose various quantities are subscripted by the periodl im whi 
it is available), the other an imperishable fiat money. ::ut::o::: 
or consumers (whose various attributes are superscripted 
�d 
ns 
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in which they are born, say, h = 0,1,, • .  ) are either present at the 
inception of the economy -- in which case they live out the balance 
of their lives during period 1 -- or born at the beginning of each 
period t 6 1 -- in which case they live out the whole of their lives 
during that and the succeeding period. Thus, in each period there are 
always just two age groups of consumers, an older generation born in the 
preceding period, say, Gt-l' and a younger generation born in the 
current period Gt. For the most part we will only be concerned with 
one or the other of the two simplest conceivable demographic patterns, 
namely, that either Gt {t} for t 6 0 -- each generation consists 
of a single consumer or GO = {O} and Gt {2t-l,2t} for t 6 1 --
the oldest generation consists of a single consumer, and each succeeding 
. f 1 generation o two consumers. 
Each consumer in each generation h £ Gt' t 6 0 (potentially) 
derives satisfaction or utility Uh from consuming goods during his 
lifetime h c h = cl 
h for h £ G0 and c 
h h (ct,ct+l) for h £ Gt' t 6 1.
This fundamental economic hypothesis is represented by a utility 
function Uh = Uh (ch) for ch 6 0, herein typically assumed to be at least 
continuous, quasi-concave (i. e., to exhibit a diminishing marginal rate of 
substitution) and to have no local maxima (i.e. , to exhibit local 
nonsatiation). 2 Each consumer also has given endowments of the goods 
available during his lifetime yh h y1 
> O for h £ G0 and
yh = (y�,y�+l) � 0 for h £ Gt' t 6 1, while each consumer in the
oldest generation has a given endowment of money mh > 0 for h £ G0.
We assume that the total amount of money in the economy consistis of 
one unit l mh = 1 (so that if G0 = {O}, then m
0 = 1), whJhtamouri 
hEGO  to defining the monetary unit. Finally, each consumer can buy land 
sell (within physical and temporal capabilities) either goodi dr 
money on both a spot and a one-period futures market at perflc1ly 
foreseen (present value) prices, denoted p and p, respectite�y. 3 
Given these opportunities, he chooses his :ifetim: consumptiln
rationally, that is, as some optimal solution to the budget bo
utility maximization problem 
(1) 
and 
(2) 
maximize 
h h U (c1)
b. h < h + hsu Ject to c1 = y1 pmm 
maximize 
subject to 
h cl 6 0
_Uh(ch) 
h h ptct 
+ Pt+lct+l
h c 6 0 
h h 
� ptyt 
+ Pt+lYt+l
for h £ 
for h £ 
profi!! 
strJI 
0 
t' t 
Aggregate consistency in these choices completes uhelmodem 
A competitive equilibrium is a set of positive goods prices,! t geth lll 
with a nonnegative price of money, and optimal lifetime consumntion 
profiles satisfying market clearing 
d 
1. 
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(3) l c� l Y� or � h h l (ct-yt) l h h -(ct-yt) for t � 1.
hE:G 1UG t- t hE:Gt_1UGt hE:Gt-1 
hE:Gt 
As suggested in the introduction, an important distinction will be 
that between a barter equilibrium a competitive equilibrium.in 
which pm 0 -- and a monetary equilibrium -- a competitive equilibrium 
in which pm > 0. Also, we will occasionally refer to the set of 
lifetime consumption profiles corresponding to some competitive 
equilibrium as a competitive allocation. In contrast, a feasible 
allocation (explicitly taking the notion of perishable physical goods 
to entail free disposal) is simply a set of nonnegative lifetime 
consumption profiles satisfying materials balance 
(4) l c� ;;; l Y� for t � 1. 
hE:Gt_1UGt hE:Gt_1UGt 
To complete the list of standard definitions in this context, we 
define a particular feasible allocation (for instance, some competitive 
allocation), say, {ch'}, to be Pareto optimal if there is no other 
h" feasible allocation {c } such that 
h h" h h' U (c ) � U (c ) for all h � 0 
(5) and 
h h" h h' U (c ) > U (c ) for some h � 0. 
The foregoing description of an economy generally differs 
from the canonical consumption-loan model in only one s1gnificant 
respect, namely, in admitting the possibility of heterogeneit 
tastes for and endowments of goods both within and across glne
While it is this degree of freedom which plays a dominant rll
our analysis, there are several additional, minor variationl 
will also call upon for support: (i) Availability of a secln
physical commodity: Formally, such a commodity can be accoJnt' 
for merely by reinterpreting c,y and p as 2-vectors. Howevlr,
particular purposes it will be less confusing to introduce l more 
clearly distinct notation for the quantity, endowment and (irasent 
I value, i. e. , with the first commodity in period 1 as numerair
this second commodity, x, w and q, respectively. (ii) Shortlr: (or
lifetimes: For this extension we will simply adopt the fonha ity
. . h d h ( h h) d ( h h) d l � reinterpreting c an y -- or c ,x an y ,w -- an t .. e�r 
aggregate counterparts as needs be. (iii) Money endowments l tc 
I consumers in other than the oldest generation: This extensio 
easily accomplished by specifying that such endowments occul · 
 second period of life mh = m�+l for hE:Gt' t � 1, and includtn'
present value on the righthand side of the budget constraint · 
(In particular instances., some of these endowments may be nlg
or may correspond to "taxes" rather than "subsidies".) 
The virtue -- and, as with moral rectitude, limitat�on 
of our basic model is that, because there is only a single �odd 
I 
available, and a single period overlap, the set of potential 
competitive equilibria can be succinctly characterized. 
define (presupposing (1), (2) and (3) )
0 
.ble 
of 
er) 
r, 
11 
zt excess demand by generation t-1 for the good in their second 
and 
gt 
period of life 
l ( h h 
hEG 
ct-yt)
t-1 
l - (ch- h)
hEG t 
yt 
t 
excess supply by generation t of the good in their first 
period of life 
) {(zt,zt+l 
\' h h h h (zt,zt+l) = l (-(ct-yt), (ct+l-yt+l))hEGt 
such that (c�,c�+l) is an optimal solution 
to (2) for some (pt,pt+l) > O} 
reflected generational offer curve of generation t
for t <;;; 1. Now note that (i) z1 = l (c�-y�) = l pmm
h = Pm•he:G0 he:G0 
while (ii) by suitable choice of the units for measuring the good 
in each period, l yh = y > 0 for t<;;; 1.4 Then, it is easily seen
h G tE t 
that the set of potential competitive equilibria is essentially 
equivalent to the set of solutions to the fundamental dynamical system 
(6) 
{z1;;;; 0 
(zt,zt+l) 
5 E gt and zt � y for t <;;; 1. 
In other words, given the basic data describing population sti 
 
Gt for t ;;;; 0, and individual tastes and endowments U
h and yl 
he:G , t ;;;; 0, the potential evolution of the economy is comple 
cap:ured, in terms of the "reduced" data describing reflectLi' 
generational offer curves g for t <;;; 1 and aggregate first be t 
I endowment y, by means of the system (6) . For future referenc
will be useful to bear in mind that, except possibly for boLn 
endowments, 0 E gt for t <;;; 1 (so that typically zt = 0 for It 
solution to (6) which means, of course, that there is some 
equilibrium), while if (zt,zt+l) E gt, then
> > zt+l { = } 0 according as zt { = } 0 
(so that every solution to (6) is nonnegative -- which is, 
our prime motivation for employing the reflected offer cu1e
• 
than the standard offer curve itself). Moreover, perhaps mos 
importantly, points on the reflected generational offer cu�e
also represent competitive allocations must satisfy the eqjat
 
zt+l/zt = pt/pt+l = 1 + rt = one plus the real rate of r 
from period t to 
The core of our analysis involves focusing on a ls· 
special cases, that is, detailed specifications of Gt, 
hence gt and y, and answering the following sorts of 
questions: 
ely 
iod 
1 . What are the solutions to (6) , and thus (1)- (3)? In particular, 
(knowing that there is a barter equilibrium) is there a monetary 
equilibrium? In fact (assuming replication in the basic data), a 
stationary monetary equilibrium? 
and 
2 . What properties do these solutions exhibit? In particular, is 
some barter equilib�ium Pareto optimal? If not, is some monetary 
equilibrium? 
Partly as an exercise to gain familiarity with technique, 
but mostly as a review to provide foundation for comparison, we turn 
first to utilizing (6) to analyze the competitive equilibria in 
Samuelson ' s  basic model. 
III. SAMUELSON ' S  BASIC MODEL 
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Samuelson ' s  central story (and more) can be fully elaborated 
in terms of the leading special case of our model, where (i) each 
generation consists of just a single consumer, so that Gt = {t}
for t G 0, and (ii) each consumer but the oldest has the same utility 
function, so that Ut (ct) = U (ct) for t G 1 -- where U is now assumed to be
differentiable, strictly quasi-concave and strictly increasing -- as 
well as the same positive endowments, so that yt = (y1,y2) > 0 for
t � 1 . 7  The critical feature of this case is that, besides being 
stationary, the reflected generational offer curve derives from the 
rational behavior of the representative consumer, so that 
gt=g={(zl,z2): (-z ,z )G- (y ,y ) 
()U(-z.l+yl,z2+y2) au(-z1+Y1 • 
1 2 · 1 2 ' dC -/ -�:__::__ 1 ac2 
and - p1z1+p2z2=0 for
for t G 1, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 . 
From careful study of these figures, it becomes appa�ent 
consequences f� that this particular feature has two important 
4 
} 
structure of g, the solutions to (6), and thus the nature of cpmpet�IW.ve 
equilibrium: First, g intersects the origin just once. 
words, there is a unique (stationary) barter 
by prices p1 = 1, pt /Pt+l = 1 + rt = 1 + r for t G 1 and pmi=, 
yielding the autarkic allocation c� = Y� and (c�,c�+l) = (yi,�2) 
(Here, as in what follows, we utilize notation which is eittler 
defined in the text or informally defined in the various aclo
figures . )  Second, in addition, g intersects the 45° line il tbe 
positive quadrant, just once, if and only if it has slope llss
I one at the origin . In other words, there will also be a uniq�e 
stationary monetary equilibrium, supported by prices p1 = l l Pit 
1 + r = 1 for t G 0 and p = p*, and yielding the trading 11
'.Ocl
t m m 
y� + (y1-cf) and (c�,c�+l) = Ccf,c�) for t G 1
or ct < y1 and c� > y2 -- if and only if 1 + r < 1 . In short,I the
dichotomy emphasized earlier in Section I ultimately dependb 
the magnitude of the representative consumer ' s  marginal ratl df 
substitution at his endowments 
G 1. 
ct > 0 
c�+l 
Yz 
la. 
Figure 1. 
ct t+l 
c� 
I/ offer curve 
zt+: 
"g 
zt+l = zt 
Y1 
Consumer Behavior 
t ct 
Y1 
lb. Dynamical System 
Potential Competitive Equilibria in Samuelso
n's Basic Model: 
au(y1,Yzl au<Y1·Y2l 
Only a Single Barter Equilibrium ( a / a = 1 + r ;;:; 
1) 
c. c2 
zt 
U = U(cf ,c�) 
J. 
zt+l 
"g '11/t+l = zt 
,/.
offer cute 
I 
I 
I 
I' , 
y - r----
' 
I 
' 
\ ' 
Yz slope - y zt 
2a. 
Figure 2. 
" 
" 
p* m Y1 
c* 1 Y1 
Consumer Behavior 
t ct 
2b. Dynamical System 
Potential Competitive Equilibria in Samuelson's Basic Model: 
au(y1 ,y2l aucy1 ,y2l 
Also a Continuum of Monetary Equilibria ( a I a Cl Cz 
= 1 + r < 1) 
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au(y1,y2) au < Y1 · Y2) --- I --=-"--"-ac1 ac2 
1 + r. 
Continuing with an explicit description of that d[dfuotom 
and with heavy reliance on graphical intuition and argument! �+ we 
notice next that, in fact, there will be a whole range ·of mpn4tary 
equilibria, corresponding to prices of money satisfying 0 <I pj � p 
if and only if there is a stationary monetary equilibrium, �Hat is 
once again, 1 + r < 1 . 8 This situation is suggestively 
exemplified in Figure 3, which contrasts the two possible cases: 
the one hand, in the "normal" case (pictured in Figure 3a) ,l wd hav 
p = p*, so that (i) if p = p , then competitive equilibri6ml is m m m m 
necessarily the stationary monetary one, while (ii) if Pm <lpt, th 
competitive allocation necessarily converges monotonically to the 
sentative consumer ' s  endowments. On the other hand, in thel "abno 
(pictured in Figure 3b) , we have pm> p�, so that evidentlyl matter 
not nearly so transparent. Indeed, in this case, there gener 
not be just a single competitive equilibrium corresponding lo 
lly 
each 
 (sufficiently large) price of money, nor even any recognizabl� pat 
to the asymptotic behavior of competitive allocation -- eveh tjhoug 
have chosen to depict a competitive equilibrium which replila�es 
cyclically every two periods.9 
These various cases (i.e., 1 + r � 1 or 1 + r < ll add 
"normality" or "abnormality") have their counterparts 
welfare implications. In particular, using the fact that 
strictly quas.i-concave so that transfers from consumer 
of 
ass 
to 
consumer t - 1 via consumer t, transfers which also '" 'l" �i 
re-
" case 
re 
d 
n 
e 
d 
n 
zt+l 
y 
g !,/ 
I I I t I. I I I I 
y 
Pm p: = pm 
3a. The "Normal 11 Case 
zt+l 
"1 zt+l = zt 
y 
zt 
l 
__ l\ __ ---
\ 
""' 
--� 
-- --
/ 
/pjl\ / II -
/ z* p 
/ m 
z2t z2t-l 
Pm 
3b. The "Abnormal" Case 
Figure 3. Examples of both Stationary (0) and Nonstationary (-••) 
Monetary Equilibria in Samuelson's Basic Model 
17 . 
�.,lt+l = zt 
y zt 
� '· 
the intermediary consumer ' s  welfare, necessarily involve �nc 
nnfavorable r�l '•� of 'rade be'-eeo good ' and good '� 
it can be easily demonstrated that if 1 + r � 1, then the ba 
equilibrium is Pareto optimal, while if 1 + r < 1, then ttie 
lo I • monetary equilibrium is Pareto optimal. In contrast, bud a 
explicitly using the fact that U is assumed strictly quas -d 
so that U (c1, c2) < U(cy,c�) for every c1 + c2 � y1 + Yz sjch 
(c1,c2) # Ccy,c�) -- if 1 + r < 1, then in the "normal" cjse 
I allocation corresponding to each competitive equilibrium (la 
monetary) except the stationary monetary one is strictly dlo: 
by that corresponding to the latter . In other words, in bhi 
neither the barter equilibrium nor any nonstationary moneja' 
equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
For the same basic reason, in the "abnormal" case; 
 the barter equilibrium nor any nonstationary monetary equil� 
yielding 'he •�• (endo�en,,) allooa,ion a•ymP'''ioally � 
such that lim z = 0 -- is Pareto optimal. But in this case t-><x> t 
 general welfare status of the nonstationary monetary equi]i� 
mixed, since it can be proven that every competitive equiJib 
that lim sup z > 0 is in fact Pareto optimal -- includinJ, t-><x> t 
I the specific periodic equilibrium depicted in Figure 3b. (W
proof of this assertion, which we also refer to in the fo�lo 
the argument is quite straightforward but rather tedious. ) 
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Given our present purposes, the foregoing descript1ve 
analysis of Samuelson ' s  basic model has already been aptlj smmmar d 
19 
by the two Propositions stated in Section I. We now proceed to the 
heart of the paper, to the demonstration that these properties are 
actually very model-bound. Before doing so, however, we might well 
underline that in each of the following arguments we will utilize 
essentially the same graphical heuristic utilized here (though bolstered 
now and then by analytical means).  We take this rehearsal as providing 
license to be somewhat terse in presentation, if not also in interpretation. ·  
IV . COEXISTENCE OF BOTH BARTER AND MONETARY EQUILIBRIA WHICH ARE 
PARETO OPTIMAL 
The model underlying the two examples presented in this 
section differs in only one essential respect from Samuelson's basic 
model, to wit, in that there are two distinct types of consumers in 
every generation but the oldest. More specifically, suppose now that 
G0 = {O} and Gt = {2t-l, 2t} for t � 1, and that the odd-numbered 
h h a h h consumers are of a-type, so that U (c ) = U (c ) and y Ya > 0 for 
uf3cch) h = 2t-l, t � 1, the even-numbered h h of f3-type, so that U (c ) 
h and y 
a J. f3 y Ty • 
i > 0 for h = 2t, t � 1 -- where generally Ua f uf3 and 
Even this seemingly minor modification, by permitting 
greater freedom in specifying the reflected generational offer curves 
(which are, as before, stationary over time gt = g for t� 1) , entails 
fundamentally contrary consequences for the conclusions outlined in 
the preceding section. The most important of these, and the one we 
detail here, is illustrated by the two examples shown in Figures 4 and 5.  
The key feature of these counterexamples is that in the first 
(resp. , second) (i) when the real rate of return is zero, p1/p2 = 1,
11/ offer curve c h t+l 
Cl 
Y1 
1i slope - 1  
Cl - type consumer: h. = 2t - 1  
ch 
t 
a 
Yz 
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the S-type consumer wants to save more (resp., less) thaa �he 
a-consumer wants to dissave during their mutual first pelibU of
i.e., in Figure 4 a < b (resp., in Figure 5 a > b) , whill i�ii) 
real rate of return is -- within an appropriate bound -- l h�gher 
1 > p1 /p2 • R (resp., l�er , !! > p1/p2 > 1) , <he �<ype rorisume 
a vertical segment on his offer curve , and the S-type a ho: 
JJ 
izon 
h 2t. Thi.e. , c� is constant for h 2t - 1 ,  and ct+l for h
e· 
on ta 
order to simplify their presentation, these specific exlJ1es 
somewhat extreme behavior ,  since (partly) vertical or ho :i! 
offer curves implicitly require a region of inferiority �d 
whose consumption is unchanged. Verification that this bp 
the 
cial 
is only a convenient simplification we leave as an exercls
verification that it is also a legitimate simplification! .�� lea 
the Appendix. 
The critical similarity in these counterexamplr� lis t
they each display multiple stationary barter equilibria, 12 ran
from one which is Pareto optimal (corresponding to goodsl[ p
.
i 
- -(t-1) 
ices 
ding 
I 
pt = (1 + r) for t;;; 1) to one which isn ' t  (corresro
goods prices p = (1 + r) -(t-l) for t;;; 1). Their criticat - dis_ 
larity is that the first (in this sense analogous to that , 
in Figure 2) also has a single stationary monetary equiJi� 
. I 1ctu1 
ium 
is , of course (by virtue of its corresponding zero real Irate of 
Pareto optimal -- while the second (in this sense analogous to 
pio<ured in Figure 1) haso' <. Refleo<ing oo <hese <wo 1oriJ,L!er 
mainly by literally drawing their implications for the solution 
22 
e, 
the 
as 
in 
dy 
od 
ti on 
to 
g 
i-
which 
turn) , 
t 
ons , 
0 (6) 
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(in diagrams like Figures 4b and Sb), leads to the following important 
conclusions: On the one hand, in general, there is no direct connection 
between the level of the price of money and any descriptive or 
prescriptive properties of competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, 
in particular, there is no necessary relationship between the potentiality 
for monetary equilibrium and the optimality of barter equilibrium. 
Moreover, the second example suggests an even more striking 
conclusion. Suppose we ignore the possibility of barter equilibrium 
(especially the possibility of any which is Pareto optimal) -- either 
on practical grounds (observing that monetary institutions are intrinsic 
to all but the most primitive societies) or, perhaps better, on 
theoretical grounds (appealing to the extensions of Samuelson's basic 
model employed to construct the examples elaborated in the last two 
parts of the following section). Then, this economy has the property 
that, though there are competitive equilibria which are Pareto optimal, 
(again, as in the "abnormal" case of Samuelson's basic model, essentially 
characterized by the condition lim sup zt > O), these may be neither t-><xl 
easily discernable nor on any reasonable grounds -- expectedly laissez-
faire. In particular, it is straightforward to establish that for large 
enough values of r > 0 (or E. < O), the smallest periodicity of any 
competitive equilibrium which replicates cyclically and which is also 
Pareto optimal may be arbitrarily large. 13
In thus emphasizing the importance of periodicity (of which 
stationarity is the simplest realization) we are tacitly embracing 
the widely held professional belief that, in order for perfect 
foresight (or, more fashionably, rational expectations) to be a 
reasonable description of individual accoDDJlodation to uncertainty, 
there must be sufficient regularity of aggregate outcomes 
for example, correct information about the past provides a 
basis for accurate prediction of the future. 
V. NONEXISTENCE OF ANY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM (BARTER 
WHICH IS PARETO OPTIMAL 
Merely enlarging on Samuelson's basic model by 
heterogeneity within each generation does 
implication: In such an economy, there is always 
0 tll 
nd 
equilibrium which is Pareto optimal, in fact, one which is lalso 
stationary (or, alternatively, monetary, provided that sucn 
exist). Here we present a recital of examples denying evel tbe 
generality of this proposition -- counterexamples which deJeni 
order of their appearance at center stage, on nonstationarityl in 
tastes and endowments (or heterogeneity across succeeding leri' 
nonmonotonicity in tastes (or satiation from iDlllloderate coJsu 
and nonconvexity in tastes (or enhancement from unbalanced l c< 
Among these examples we can distinguish a core (spe' 
 the subset including only those pictured in Figures 7, 9 ,  l01and 
whose significance extends far beyond their immediate bad Jid�ng. 
In brief, these particular examples suggest a potentially Jersuas 
argument in favor of continued, conscious government inte�ention 
competitive, market process -- one which doesn't rely on pluc�ty 
I information, singularity of externalities, or any of the othelr st
reasons for market failure. Rather, this case rests squarllyl on n 
general, fundamental welfare implication: There mav be no lori<te-an 
4 
re 
a 
) ' 
y, 
the 
rd 
r 
or-all 
redistribution of wealth between the members of any finite number of 
generations which will permit the competitive mechanism unaided to 
attain a socially desirable allocation. 
The validity of this assertion can be easily established 
simply by formalizing all such restricted wealth transfers in terms 
25 
of alternative distributions of money endowments (referring for details 
to the comment following our description of the basic model in 
Section II). Now, each of the core examples , including that which 
depends on nonstationarity, has a very important characteristic : The 
particular period during which markets first open (heretofore always 
taken as period 1) is essentially immaterial to the behavior of the 
economy in that and each succ.eeding period -- provided that only the 
then current older generation has a money endowment, Moreover, given 
any finite distribution of money endowments , there must always come 
a period after which the creation (or destruction) of money ceases , 
or equivalently, in which -- relative to all later generations 
only the then current older generation has a money endowment . A 
fortiori, the demonstration of nonexistence when only the oldest 
generation has a money endowment suffices also when -- only to some 
14limited extent -- other generations have as well . 
Having this point always clearly in mind, we are then well 
prepared to view the rehearsal of the various types of counterexamples. 
A. Nonstationarity 
The simplest stories involving nonstationarity require only 
slight perturbations of the most familiar example from Samuelson ' s  
basic model , already previously sketched in Figure 2. Explici�ly 
building on that example, suppose now that some maverick colsur.er ti 
t' t '  . t I I t '  has either completely inflexible tastes U ( c  ) = min {ct,lly1 , ct '
t' or completely skewed endowments y = (O,y2) ,  while every othetr co
15 : j ust as before. Then, the dynamical system characterizing qompe 
equilibrium is as shown in Figure 6, which has as its only ko�utio 
zt = 0 for t E; 1 .  In other words , under either of these hJ�tlhes 
the only competitive equilibrium is the barter one, which il 'lbvio_ 
not Pareto optimal -- since it is possible to improve the jeli are I 
every o�•�r t > t '  (without affecting the �lfare of an, other 
consumer 1 a ta t ' )  by switching to the alternative allocati©n 
tc 
ty for 1 a ta t '  
(yl , y2 + (y1 - c!) ) for t t '  + 1
c* otherwise. 
Though these examples do illustrate the essential itlea 
underlying the whole argument in this section (namely ,  to jtrhctu 
tastes and endowments so as to bar any stationary equilibriu 
is also Pareto optimal) ,  they have at least two objectiona�l 
whid 
fe) 
In the first place, the least complicated redistribution slhemes 
will permit attainment of a socially desirable allocation lrel all
I indistinguishable from the origination of fiat money itself :dalbe 
some appropriate later date t > t '  in the economy' s  histor�) f  
second place, there is no room left for the existence of a�y lmone 
In 
1 
2}
er is 
ive 
y 
es . 
h 
t 
at 
e 
y 
zt+l 
6a. 
Figure 6. 
zt+l 
zt+l = zt 
y zt 
gt = g for t 1' t '
\t. 
;. 
�l = zt 
z· t 
zt for t "' 1 gt, 
.!' 
zt '  zt for t "' t '
Inflexible Tastes 
t' t '  t '  t' (U (c ) = min {ct,/y1,ct ' +/Y2}) 
6b. Skewed Endowments 
t '  ( y  = (O,y2)) 
Nonexistence due to Nonstationarity: Two Examples 
with a Single Jump in Tastes or Endowments 
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left ��r 
rily 
ions 
-- i 
equilibrium (precisely for the same reason there is no rooni 
the existence of any Pareto optimal equilibrium). A necebs 
�r• oumplioa<•d ��pl• wi<huu< ei<h•r uf <he <h•a• limif a 
so, in particular, with both barter and monetary equilibri� 
depicted in Figure 7. Here again we have G = {t} for t 1' 
Ut is such that it (i) yields an offer curv: which has a le: 
segment between (3, 1) and ( 3 , 4) and (ii) satisfies Ut(2, 211) 
, buti l lii!OW 
tic a 
t -(t-1) -t 
utJlllL 16 
Ill I 
while y = (3 + 3 , 1 - 3 ) for t ;;;;; 1. Close examina' ion 
Figure 7 reveals that, although p = 1, every solution tol ('�) m 
the upper bound y suitably replaced by zt 
t yt) must 
autc t) aut< t) -=-=-�y-L.. I y '° t t -act act+l
P/Pt+l
since otherwise, typically, there will be some t· < 00 sue� �rat _ 
•; ' i;, <hero ia � r •uoh <ha< (r;,r) £ •;• whioh ia ,,,, aia£
with (6) . But from this it follows directly that every commetit 
allocation is strictly dominated by the stationary allocJti©n 
t c 
{y� .+ 2 
(2,2) 
for t = 0, 
otherwise 
. 0 0 0 0 -since U (y1 + 2) > U (y1 + pm) 
0 0) 0 0 ' cl ;;;;; U (c1 for every c1 ;;;;; su h th 
0 < 0 + d 'f c1 = y1 pm' an i 
autc t) autc t)y I y '° t act
t -act+l 
P/Pt+l :;; 1/3 ,
ough 
ct t+l 
4 
2 
1 
1 - 3-t 
zt+l 
22 = 1/3 . 
" __ , '"i \ 
z., = 3 '\ 
ii g3 
offer curve 
t -(t-1) ct 2 3 3+3 
Behavior 7a. Consumer 
\ ''\gl &z 
1./ ,J Lz = zt+l vt 
zt 
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Figure 7. Nonexistence due to Nonstationarity: An Example with 
Systematically Changing Tastes and Endowments 
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then 
Ut (2, 2) > Ut(3,l) � Ut(c1, c2) for every (c1, c2) � 0
such that ptcl + Pt+lc2 
< t + t 
= 
ptyt Pt+lYt+l
for t� 1 (so that the welfare of every consumer is improved)! iJhile 
1 t t+1 I · y1 = 4 and Yt+l + Yt+l = 4 for t � 1 (so that the allocation is' 
feasible). 
B .  Nonmonotonicity 
It is well-known that local (and hence global) satiation 
already raises difficulties for the first basic theorem of welf' 
economics within the barest standard framework usually employld: 
I . in expositing the principles of general equilibrium theory. fig re 8 
it) illustrates an example of precisely the same type of difficulty 
the present context, an example again patterned after that inJrotluce 
earlier in Figure 2. Here, because consumer 0 is satiated at lthe co 
level c� -- well below y2 + (y1-cy) -- every competitive allodat�on . 
dominated by one or the other of two alternatives: On the onj s�de, 
·f -0 h h · · 11 · I b · i pm a c1 - y2, t en t e competitive a ocation converges monot nic 
to the representative consumer's endowments, and is therefore ldomina 
the stationary allocation (which entails some free disposal o� gbod 
hence is itself, for this reason alone, not Pareto optimal) 
t c 
{-0 c1 for t = 0 
(cf , c�) otherwise. 
On the other side, if c1
° - y2 < p a p , then -- because conshmar 0m m ' · 
ption 
nd 
uo 
Yz Yz + (yl-cp
zt+l 
Ba. 
t ct+l 
c* 2 
Yz 
0 cl 
Consumer Behavior 
8b. Dynamical System 
c* 1 
�zt+l = zt 
Y1 
zt 
Figure 8. Nonexistence due to Nonmonotonicity: Global Satiation, 
Especially for the Oldest Generation 
t ct 
31 
0 "wasting" an amount pm - (;;:1-y2) > 0 of good 1 -- it is dobi 
augmenting the first period consumption of consumer 1 by Jo
smaller) amount , everything else remaining the same (a felsi 
which also may fail to be Pareto optimal) . 
Since all that this particular argument really ieq 
that u0 have a global maximum at a sufficiently low level l of 
one might sensibly wonder why we've chosen to depict suchla 
32 
(p .bly 
le cation 
etry unnecessarily complicated example. The sort of intergenerd 
consideration remarked in the second paragraph in footnotl 
some rationale. A more compelling justification, however
the general structure of tastes pictured on the righthand s 
Figure Sa, and reflected in Figure Sb , suggests the possibt 
co�<�c<ing � �ple in which ao� leeeer degree of ••f i 
naturally puts a damper on the real rate return -- and henc 
of the mere presence of money as a restorative for Paretd o
prov:t11aes 
s 
de o 
ity 
ti on
In order to follow up this suggestion, we need �� 
'.hell �1ficacy timamfl y.
st t
introduce a second perishable physical commodity. So,  asl cimtlin 
-previously in Section II, suppose now that there is omm' 
ermo,� 
suppose once more that in each generation but the oldestlthfre J�m 
end�: 
another 
q. Fjrt whose quantity is denoted x, endowment w and price 
two consumers Gt = {2t-l, 2t} for t � 1 whose tastes for Ian 
of the two commodities depend only on whether they are ocl'd-lor �I 
numbered. In particular, odd-numbered consumers h = 2t-J f r t
are of a-type, and have tastes of the form 
h h h a h h U (c ,x ) = U (c )  + V(xt) '
and endowments of the form 
y ,  
en ts 
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h h (y , w ) = (y1, y2, w, O); 
Ua is differentiable, strictly quasi-concave and has a global maximum 
-a -a -a -a at (c1, c2), where c1 < y1, c2 > Yz and 
-a c2 - Yz
-a. 1 + r < 1, cl - Y1 
while V is differentiable, concave and strictly increasing, so that 
dV(x) > O. dx 
In contrast, even-numbered consumers h = 2t for t � 1 are of S-type, 
and have both simpler tastes of the form 
Uh(ch, xh) = US(ch) 
and simpler endowments of the form 
h h (y , w ) = (yl, y2, 0, 0); 
US is differentiable, strictly quasi-concave and strictly increasing, 
and also satisfies the condition 
auSCY1·Yz) /
acl 
a 
Y ) au CY1• 2 /
acl 
aua(yl, y2) 
ac2 
1 + r < 1 + r. 
(This last assumption merely eases description of the appropriate 
reflected generational offer curve. ) 
After modifying (2) and (3) in an obvious way to accommodate 
this second commodity (duly noting that all commodity prices must 
t 
! 
still be positive in order to be consistent with market clear�ng) 
we find that for all practical purposes, this example reduJe�I to 
I i very special case of our basic model, by virtue of the folloW!i-ng 
considerations: Only a-type consumers own and value the slcbhd 
commodity. Hence, in every competitive equilibrium it mus� b� tr 
Zt-1  that x = w and q > 0 for t � O. But such market cleari�g 
condit:ons for the s:cond commodity will be a consequence 1f : lrati 
behavior on the part of a-type consumers only if 
-a 
and 
cz - Yz
P/Pt+l < - -a 1 + r < 1 cl - Y1
qt 
= ( dV(w) I aua(c2t-l) )
dxZt-l a Zt-1 t ct 
pt 
for t � i. 17 In other words, in this example, the appropr!ia'ue 
reflected generational offer curve for the purpose of charl�tl.eriz 
the set of potential competitive equilibria is derived froL :ti.he t 
representative consumers ' offer curves under the hypothesi� ltlhat 
price of the second commodity can and does adjust so as to 
each a-type consumer ' s  demand equal to his supply for that l c  od 
This result and its ramifications are pictured in Figure 
Two conclusions are immediately deducible from thi 
every competitive allocation necessarily converges monotonlc 
representative consumers 1 endowments. Second, and the morll
.
e ·1igni 
of the two from our present perspective, every competitive a loca
thus strictly dominated by the stationary allocation 
4 
:1 
: First, 
the 
ant 
n is 
h 
ct+l 
-a c2 
Y2 slope -
ci+r> > - 1
-a cl yl 
a- type consumer: h = 2t-l 
zt+l 
c� 
h ct+l 
c�* 
Y2 
it:" slope _ 1 
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9a. Consumer Behavior 
zt 
9b. Dynamical System 
Figure 9. Nonexistence due to Nonmonotonicity: Global Satiation in the 
First of Two Commodities 
35. 
c� 
hc 
o -a B 
Y1 + (yl-cl) + (yl-cl*)
-a -a (cl , c2) 
for h 0 
for h 2t-l 
B B -a -a (c1* ,c2* + (yl-cl) + (y2-c2) )  otherwise
and 
hx 
.0 
(w,O) 
for h 0 
for h 2t-l 
0 otherwise 
for t � 1 . 18
Notice especially that this example does in 
consumer being locally nonsatiated, that is, always 
his utility with some arbitrarily small perturbation 
consumption profile . Thus, it clearly does not have 
feature of most familiar counterexamples to the 
welfare economics . On the other hand, it 
example depends critically on having just the right 
some consumption satiation together with some 
and, for instance, this special kind of combination is 
create problems j ust for the existence of competitive 
within essentially atemporal models of the allocation 
goods . Furthermore, since such a concatenation obviously 
delicate balance , it has usually been considered 
in that context, so that one could quite rightly 
'.6 
····1·� 
f in� asing 
ifet
on 
heoJWl of 
the 
on o 
en ts 
ery 
ly 
ld 
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also be so viewed in this . While we believe that the speciality of our 
particular counterexample (and its kin) is dictated more by our technical 
procedures than by our substantive obj ectives , this position remains to 
be satisfactorily buttressed . More to the point, there is a critically 
important distinction between the two situations being modelled ; indeed , 
it would probably be hard to overemphasize the fact that a large measure 
of consumption satiation and related endowment sparsity is intrinsic to 
accurately portraying the essence of the intertemporal allocation of 
consumption goods -- both because individuals are inherently finite­
lived, and because their lives are naturally several-staged . 19
An even more extreme degree of "satiation cum sparsity" 
can be utilized to model an.economy in which, though there is a stable, 
stationary monetary equilibrium, there is still no competitive 
equilibrium which is Pareto optimal. In outline, this counterexample 
runs as follows: Suppose now that in each generation but the oldest 
there are three consumers Gt = {3t-2 , 3t-l , 3t} for t 6 1 whose tastes
and endowments are described by 
refi(c�+l ' x�) a a a (O,y2 ,w1 ,w2) for h = 3t - 2
h h h _tf3 h h h h -U (c , x  ) - U (ct , ct+l) and (y , w  ) 
uYcx�)
f3 f3 (y1 ,y2 , 0 ,0) for h = 3t - 1
(O ,o ,wY,o)  otherwise, 
a h h where U (ct+l' xt) 
. { h h} d (O a a a) . f' min ct+l'xt an ,y2 , w1 ,w2 satis ies
w� + w� - y� > 0 but ::: 0 20 , uf3 is differentiable , strictly quasi-concave
and strictly increasing , and also satisfies the condition 
au�(y� ,y�)
acl
au13(y� ,y�)
I ac2
1 + r13 :::o ' 
and uY is (like u0) continuous and strictly increasing, A.Jfsol, to
exposition, suppose that the oldest generation' s  endowment linclud 
second commodity in amount wa.2 (so that p must be reinterpreted a . m 
present value of 1 unit of money together with w� units oflthe se· 
commodity) . 
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plify 
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For such an economy, after making necessary amendmeb.ts t!millCl)­
(3) , it  is easily seen that (i)  they-type consumers ' tastls, tnta�� ,tt > 0 
for t 6 1, while their endowments entail xh = w y for h = 3L 6 Jl�i o that
(ii) the a-type consumers ' tastes and endo�ents entail bolh: 
and 
h ct+l 
qt+l 
h xt 
a a awl + w2 > Y2 
a a awl + w2 - Y2 qt + w pt > qt2
for h = 3t - 2 , t 6 1 .  (All this , o f  course,  based on thel pfovis:lll%1lal 
supposition that the economy is in competitive equilibrium!. ) '  I The
crucial upshot of these implications is that the approprialelrefl 
generational offer curve now has a very special form, sine! tlhe 
representative a-type consumer ' s  offer curve is just a singll poi
independent of all commodity prices _.,;. while the representkt ve f3 
. I consumer ' s  offer curve is just the same as in Samuelson ' s basic 
Hence , the set of potential competitive equilibria can be lenrese 
shown in Figure 10 (which explicitly assumes the least comll:ilcate 
yet still nonempty possibility, that there are only two stktWonar 
monetary equilibria) . From this figure it is evident that1e�ery 
to (6) must satisfy 
z -t+l 
a a ) (wl + w2 - Y2 
zt
pt/pt+1 � 1 + r* < 1, 
ed 
e 
1.  
d as 
but 
ution 
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Figure 10. Nonexistence due to Nonmonotonicity: 
of Two Commodities 
lOb. Dynamical System 
Local Satiation in the First 
3� 
c� 
slope l+£*
zt 
and hence, in fact, that every competitive equilibrium eitHer 
with the (unstable) stationary monetary equilibrium corresJorJ., 
(the- first) connnodities prices 
pt 
- -(t-1) (1 + r*) for t G 1, 
coin 
ing 
or, typically, converges to the (stable) stationary monetaiiy!�qui 
corresponding to (the first) commodities prices 
-(t-1) p = (1 + r*) for t G 1. t -
Thus, it is also immediately apparent that every competitile 
is therefore dominated, since every sequence of one-for-one 
transfers of the first connnodity between only B-type consuJe� 
satisfies the bounds 
0 < llc3(t-l)t+l llc
3(t+l)
t 
B -B lie < c * for t � 1 1 -
llo 
rwar 
whi 
is both feasible and -- from each of their viewpoints (by [irtue 
the fact that at best they face a uniformly negative real rate of 
return pt/pt+l - 1 � r* < 0 for t G 1) -- preferable. 
C. Nonconvexity 
' 
This counterexample is nothing more than a strai&h*torw� 
variation of the example presented previously in Figure 5, lanll. be 
simply displaying its structure -- as we do in Figure 11 -1 r 
only justifying its construction -- as we do in the Appendix. 
Note, however, that this same device, namely, injr� 
some nonconvexity into the upper reaches of the B-type conJum 
qui 
ucin: 
r ' s  
40 
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indifference map, can also be employed to provide a solid theoretical 
foundation for our earlier emphasis on the inherent difficulties attendant 
on nonuniqueness of monetary equilibrium (at the end of Section IV). 
The doggedly perservering reader should, by now, be able to follow the 
dots. 
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Figure 11. Nonexistence due to Nonconvexity 
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FOOTNOTES 
Some asymmetry in treating the start of the economy is unavoidable, 
since, for example, consumers in the oldest generation have only 
themselves to deal with during their first period of life. For 
this reason we will typically streamline the various incarnations 
of our basic model by simply assuming that the oldest generation 
consists of just a single consumer. It can be easily verified 
that nothing we have to say depends critically on this particular 
simplification. 
We should also emphasize at the outset that, unlike most of 
the literature, our specializations of the co�sumption-loan model 
will always involve a stationary population (at least after 
period 1) . Once again, nothing depends critically on this 
particular simplification -- and it has the great virtue of 
completely avoiding the notational clutter inevitably associated 
with modelling a growing population . 
Except in one case (in the second subsection of V) , we always maintain 
that these properties obtain for the tastes of consumers in the 
oldest generation . Since the relevant aspect of their lifetime 
consumption profiles is a single quantity, this simply means that 
they have utility functions which are continuous and strictly 
increasing . 
Likewise, we will almost invariably assume that, for every good, 
there is some consumer who has a utility function which is everywhere 
3. 
4. 
strictly increasing in that good . The practical import pf th 
hypothesis is that in a competitive equilibrium, every ! �dads 
will be positive (see the definition 
and the subsequent discussion of the 
competitive equilibria) .  
in the next follow{ 
characterization bf: 
Generally, we should write the price of money p • Howe· mt  
we expand the budget 
opportunities, 
constraint in (2) below to reflecl� 
h h h h < h ptct + Pt+lct+l + pm�
Amt + pmt+16mt+l = ptyt 
+ p + 
A .  h > 0 umt = 
A h > _A h umt+l = umt 
g pa 
pate 
er, 
uch 
where Amh represents the purchases (or sales, when negattve) $ I 
money during period s = t, t+l by consumer h, then an lo�vious 
arbitrage argument entails that, in a competitive equ�li 
p = p for t 6 1. For this reason we have chosen sJmp 
ri 
mt m · I ' adopt this requirement as a postulate -- and correspondi 
(and legitimately) to ignore transactions on the moneJ m 
y t 
gly 
rket 
except insofar as they affect the oldest generation ' s  !demand 
for goods. 
This manuever presumes that y� > 0 for some h E Gt for 
Otherwise, the upper bound in ( 6) must be written zt, la  
1 t 
4 
ce 
raph, 
al 
1 .  
riable . 
5. 
6. 
7. 
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We will refer to such a polar situation only once in the sequel 
(see the second example of nonstationarity, that involving only 
endowments , presented in Section V below) . In one other case 
(the third example in the same subsection) we will deliberately 
choose to streamline the description of a specific model by 
explicitly employing "natural" units for measuring the good in 
each period , so that the upper bound in (6) must also be 
written generally as zt I Y�· hEGt
It should be immediately apparent from the definitions of zt and
gt that a competitive equilibrium yields a solution to (6) . On
the other hand , the reverse argument only requires observing that , 
in the definition of gt ' goods prices can be normalized so that
they constitute a consistent sequence -- since they are assumed 
positive, while consumers are assumed rational (so that , among 
other things , those in each generation t � 2 correctly perceive 
that they are unaffected by equi-proportional shifts in the goods 
prices directly relevant to them (pt , pt+l) ) .
When zt = O for t � 1 ,  this equation amounts to a definition of
0/0 (and it is obviously necessary to go back to the basic data 
to uncover the potential paths of the real rate of return rt for
t � 1) . 
In this case, as in some others later on, there is no need to 
distinguish h from t, except insofar as the former appears as a 
8. 
9 .  
superscript ,  the latter as a subscript .  
It is· also worth remarking that consumer O 's  tastes and 
same as aly endowments ( of goods) can also be assumed the 
consumer t ' s ,  merely by reinterpreting u0 (c�) = U(c� ,yJ 1and 
y� = Yz · More generally, in each of the special cases L� l trea 
later on in which both tastes and endowments are essenjiJt1y 
stationary, we can reinterpret the model so that general±@n 0 
identical to generation t � 1 but for date of birth andl alsenc 
of ancestors . (or, more accurately, ancestors who particiJ te i 
the market economy) . The possibility of such reinterpie� 
provides the main justification for the assertion made lt 
end of the first paragraph in footnote 1 .  
ti on 
the 
A note of warning : Here, as in the sequel, we take fo:d g
.
· rante
. 
: I 
that every solution to (6) must satisfy z1 � pm � y -- wn re Pl 
depends on both g ·and y in a way which should be obvioU: 
from the diagram :epresenting the relevant dynamical slstem. 
That is , otherwise ,  when z1 > pm' there will be some t i< 
that either zt > y or zt � y but there is no z such that 
(zt , z) E gt ' both of which are inconsistent with (6) .
SU 
The artistically inclined reader can surely sketch examp�es w 
much longer periodicity -- once he is reminded that thl  
· · f · · · h · b · Isigni icant restrictions on g are t at it e continuous 
independent variable is p1/p2 > 0) ,  that it increase il 
element (with increases in p1/p2) , and that it intersebt 
positively sloped ray through the origin, but just encl . '  
each
(Se 
he 
one 
00 
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the introductory comments in the Appendix) . We should also note 
that our labelling of this second case is not to be taken seriously 
(paranoically?) . The "abnormal" case , which was apparently first 
mentioned in the literature by Gale, seems j ust as likely as the 
"normal" case -- even if it is much more bothersome, because it so 
vividly displays the ambiguity inherent in the actual evolution of 
monetary equilibrium. We shall have more to say about the 
implications of this characteristic sort of nonuniqueness in the 
following section. 
10 . These results (and their parallels in the subsequent sections) 
are so well-known that they hardly require documentation; for 
completeness '  sake, however , we refer the skeptically minded 
reader to Starrett ' s  neat general argument. Note also that such 
results may be falsified (in case 1 + r � 1) when U is not 
assumed to be strictly quasi-concave, as in Shell' s  nice 
expository piece. 
11 . The upper bound R (resp . ,  lower bound �) is chosen so that the 
length of the vertical and horizontal segments of the respective 
consumers ' offer curves is greater than b-a (resp . ,  a-b) . This 
choice guarantees (see directly below) that there are at least 
two stationary barter equilibria with positive (resp . ,  negative) 
real rate of return. 
12.  Since -- in consumption loan type models with only a single period 
overlap between generations -- barter involves just trMde b
1 
contempories , this also means that barter equilibriui Weedn 
· · d .  < h h 1 I . : 
: 
stationary, nor even perio ic see , owever , t e c osi
J· 
g r 
to this section) . For instance, there is an "irregula 11 ba 
equilibrium corresponding to goods prices which satilii 
Pt+i'Pt
{ 1 + r for 2s � t < 2s+l ,
1 + r otherw:Lse, 
s � 0 
13.  Formally, periodic monetary equilibrium requires or s 
14 . 
span of periods , or periodicity 1 � T < 00; goods 
T-1 
the property that Pt+T = pt or TI (pt+s/pt+s+l)s=O 
for t � 1 .  But in this case , any such periodicity 
also satisfy the inequality 
min 
l�T 1�T 
(1 + r) T '  (1 + E_) T-T ' <1 + r) (1 
from which the assertion in the text follows 
This argument is not quite complete, since it impliciJ 
that every competitive allocation can be strictly ilpI ' 
generation by generation. However, we will in factld 
that this stronger form of Pareto superiority is feasi· 
each of the core examples .  
In this context , it is an interesting problem (t 
one we will pursue further here) to characterize thl 
mus 
(l 
the 
< 
r 
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le 
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wealth transfers that can be (i) achieved , for instance ,  by 
assigning just nonnegative money endowments (i . e . , ostensibly, 
by issuing sub�idies rather than collecting taxes) and also (ii) 
instrumental in supporting the Pareto optimality of competitive 
equilibrium. 
15 . Thanks are due Charles Hulten of John Hopkins for pointing out 
16. 
the relevance of the first of these hypotheses for our present 
purpose .  This hypothesis , of course , already introduces an element 
of satiation. Note too that , for the second hypothesis to be 
consistent with the existence of competitive equilibrium, we 
require the boundary condition 
auco ,y2) auco ,y2)---'- I < 00 .  ocl ac2
Once again, see the Appendix for detailed instructions on how 
to lay out an indifference map which �ields such an offer curve, 
and yet at the same time satisfies such an additional restriction. 
In fact,  this example doesn ' t  require quite such extreme behavior .  
The subsequent argument remains true , for instance ,  provided 
each offer curve has a segment from ( 3 , 1) to ( · , 4) with slope 
t dct+l (or tdct
t c +1-1 average --7-- ) greater than minus one.
c -3 t 
17 . 
18 . 
19. 
The first condition must hold because otherwise ,  that is , i  !when I I 
-Cl. 
pt , /pt '+l ;;;;;
c2 - Yz
-a cl - Y1
1 + r for some t '  < oo ,  
2t ' -l I 
consumer 2t ' - 1 would demand x , > w -- since unden t.· · t 
circumstances his budget constraint encompasses the li�et 
consumption profile 
-Cl. -Cl. (c1, c2 , x) with x 
-o. -a 
pt , (yl-cl) + p t ' +l (y2-c2) w + _::'---=----==-- _::'---'-.:::__.::.____: ::_ qt '
while at this particular profile he is completely 
both his periods consumption of the first commodity, 
first period consumption of the second commodity. 
The second condition is then essentially just 
ese 
.me 
in 
ot li 
order requirement for the optimal 
2t ' -l expanded) to satisfy xt '  
solution to (2)  (suitatjly 
= • giv= <he firo< oondi<n . .  
This assertion explicitly requires that pm < y� + (y1-t��I + 
(y1-c�*) ,  a restriction which is easily satisfied , for l i�stan· 
by specifying the a-consumer' s  choice of . first period co�sumptwtln 
"' <he r�l ra" of rot= 0 �·1� •=ugh relaeivo to r� t ·4•1 1ohoioe 
at every real rate of return r � r < 0 ,  everything else , ncha
In this connection, it is also worth remarking that we lh�e 
developed variants of the counterexample depicted in Figpre 9 
which are grounded only on having heterogeneity across l g�nera 
-- but heterogeneity which is repeated regularly (so t�a� , fo l 
s 
51 
instance, generations are alternately "thrifty" and "spend -
thrifty") -- and in which it is inevitable that some consumers 
possess the only endowments of some goods which they alone value . 
We have chosen to present the more artificial construct since 
these alternatives necessarily involve introducing a third stage 
of the life cycle, and since introducing a specialized second 
commodity also admits yet another variety of quite interesting 
counterexample (as we shall now proceed to demonstrate) . 
20 . The a-type consumers could be assumed to have more flexible tastes ; 
all that is required in the following argument is that their 
choices of second period consumption satisfy the lower bound
c�+l � y� + E for t � 1, for some fixed positive number E > 0 .
Here and below ""' O "  means something like "small enough.
so that Figure 10 is qualitatively accurate . "
[l]  
[2 ] 
[ 3 ]  
[ 4 ]  
[ 5 ]  
[ 6 ]  
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APPENDIX: Construction - of -Vertical or Truncated Offer Curve$ 
AI. Introduction and Background 
The purpose of this appendix is to substantiate the �ever 
claims made in the text (both explicitly and implicitly) reglr��ng 
the possibility of constructing various types of individual lf�er 
curves . In accomplishing this purpose, it essentially amounts , �o a 
elementary exercise in demand theory• 
! 
The following central result is well-known: Considerl the 
I : typical consumer in our basic model , and suppose that his util�ty 
h I , function u is continuous , strictly in:re:sing and strictly qi uasi-
concave , while his endowment vector (yt ,yt+l) is nonnegative and 
nontrivial . Then, if (ch, ch+l) represents the unique optima!l solut t L 
I to his budget constrained utility maximization problem (2) as 
depending on (positive, finite) relative prices -- or, in colman 
I , parlance, his demand functions -- these ar_e (nonnegative and� idontint!l!aus 
and satisfy his (relative price) budget constraint 
h h (pt/pt+l) ct + ct+l 
h h (pt/pt+l)yt + Yt+l "
h � l,h )Moreover, even if U has a strict global maximum, say, at (lt i  t+l 
(but is elsewhere strictly increasing or decreasing) , the same resu1 
remains true provided , in addition, either his endowment vedtor is
h h -h -h  weakly dominated, (yt ,yt+l) � ( ct , ct+l) '  or he is. not satiatedl at 
his endowment vector, (y�,Y�+l) i (c�, c�+l) ,  and relative plites ar 
limited in range, 
� ct+l-yt+l{ }  -h h 
P/Pt+l � - -h h ct - yt 
-h {<} li i according as ct > Ytj · :I 
A-2 
The converse to these p;ropositions is already fals;tf;i,ed by 
simple examples of the sort pictured in Figures 4 and 5 (assuming 
their validity, which follows from an argument similar to that presented ' 
explicitly in the next section) . In particular, under either alternative 
set of maintained assumptions, the optimal consumption vector will 
coincide with the endowment vector for at most a single relative price 
h h -h -h (except in the singular situation where (yt ,yt+�
) = (ct , ct+l) ,  in which
case they obviously coincide at eve� relative price) . Hence, it 
would be accurate to say that the general problem (formulated in terms 
of specific questions) we are addressing here is : To what extent does 
h h the property of representing the demand functions (ct , ct+l) -- or,
h h h h equivalently, the � demand functions (ct-yt , ct+l-yt+l) composing
the offer curve, for short, simply the offer curve -- impose further 
restrictions beyond just continuity and satisfaction of a budget 
constraint? 
In a very elegant development initiating with Sonnenschein. 
[12, 13] and culminating with Mantel [9] and Debreu [4 ] ,  it has recently 
been established that -- under analogous maintained assumptions for 
n � 2 commodities and m � n individuals -- aggregate excess demand 
functions are completely characterized by continuity (in uniformly 
positive simplicial prices) and Walras ' law. While this fundamental 
result obviously has some indirect bearing on the topic of this essay, 
especially, on the conclusions exemplified by Figures 4 and 5, even in 
these examples it is not decisive for our purposes . Indeed , from the 
main line of argument in the text is should be clear that both 
continuity and (the analogue of) Walras ' law play crucial roles in 
i I 
delimiting the set of potential competitive equilibria in outl bas · .  model. Thus, for instance, the former rules out the possibil!ity 
there is no Pareto optimal stationary equilibrium, the latle� thaI there are multiple stationary monetary equilibria in Section, I V. 
Moreover , it almost goes without saying that the l r�quir of market clearing is always at center stage in our presentarlion. 
condition is especially important , for instance, in ruling l o�t th
possibility that there is some Pareto optimal stationary equ�libr 
I . competitive equilibrium -- in lSect and , hence, any Pareto optimal 
AII. Vertical Offer Curves 
We concentrate attention on the details of the nb�stati 
example described in Figure 7 .  Also, in order to simplify! �ll.e 
discussion, here we will employ somewhat more conventional! ri tatL 
tilJ 
-3 
t 
is 
v .  
.rity 
namely, (x,y) for the consumption vector, (again) U for th'e i 
function and (x,y) for the endowment vector. Exactly the la 
principle• apply ro rarionali><ing rhe preference •<rucrur, � 
the heterogeneity examples described in Figures 4 and 5 --; e 
e ba� 
der1�mfg 
cept lll�!at , 
roughly speaking, the roles of x and y become reversed . 
What we propose to show, then, is that given (i)I (_i,y) 
uchsuch that � < x and y > y, (ii) y > y and (iii) (x*,y*) > r 
x* < � and y* > y, it is possible to construct U : R� + R iliich 
continuous , strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave and r uch 1·� 
1 .  The offer cu�e orlginari"" ac (i,jf) i• verrical beJe,\ C,,.il 
- - - # I I I and (x,y) ::: (�,y) . 
# Thus, for the sake of symmetry in various expressions , 
changeably use the notation x = �' and later on, x ' = x 
ill ,1!111 
11 . 
t 
t 
er-
A-4 
2 .  The indifference curve passing through �._y) lies strictly below 
(i. e. , to the southwest of) (..x*,y*) . 
The idea of this construction is wholly geometric , and is 
fully elucidated by .Figure Al. An algorithm for the construction 
proceeds as follows : Pick two functions ! : R+ + -R and f : R+ + R
which are differentiable, strictly decreasing and strictly convex, 
which satisfy f(x) < f (x) for x � 0
y_-y - - -f (x) = y_, f ' (x) = --:; and f (x) = y, - - - x-x 
and which yield f (x*) < y*, 
- - y-y f ' (x) = =-::::-, respectively. x-x In 
particular , this choice entails that the curves y = f(x) and y = f(x) 
for x � 0 have the following relationships to the budget constraints 
- - -y_-y 
- --_ x + y  x-x 
y_-y. �-yx y_-y 
- - i + y or y = -=--......: + - x 
x-x x-x �-x 
(Al) -< and 
- .Y::Y. x + y 
i-x 
- � x + y or y = �-� + � x,
x-x x-x x-x 
respectively: 
{ } �-zx z-y f(x) : -=-:- + --:- x 
�-x �-x 
(A2) -< and 
f (x) : --=--:-- + ::-: x { } Yi-Yi y-y 
x-x x-x 
according as x {:} �
according as x {:} i. 
Generally, such functions ! and f can be found in the parametric class 
ax yx f (x) = a + be + ce with a +  b + c > O ,  a < O, (b ,c ) > 0 and (13,y) < O .
y 
y 
Y*· 
y ' 
::t.. 
y 
Figure Al. 
" 
yx-yx .tl y • -- + _ _  x x-x/ x-x 
x* ,!. • x' • x i 
Construction of a Utility Function which Yields a ' 
Vertical Segment on the Offer Curve and Satisfied 
an Additional Dominance Condition. 
A-5 
tl')f{x) y-::t.. 
So, without any loss of generality, assume in addition that i.tfil .f(x) 
lim f (x} < O, so that, in particular , both functions also intersect 
X-><x> 
the x-axis . 
A-6 
Next, define indifference curves (covering the whole 
nonnegative quadrant) in terms of the two functions i and f thusly: 
(i) for (x ' ,  y' ) ;;:; 0 and 0 � y '  � i (x ' )  ,' the indifference curve is the
appropriate segment (i . e . , that lying in the nonnegative quadrant) of 
the radial projections of (x,f(x) ) (i . e . ,  as x varies over the 
nonnegative halfline) toward the origin in proportion 
(A3) f if x' = y' = 0 a = y ' /f(x' )  if x' = O ,  y '  > 0 . x '  /x" otherwise , 
where x" is defined by f(x") /x" = y '  /x' if x '  > O ;  (ii) for (x ' ,y' ) ?: 0. 
and f(x' )  � y' � f(x ' ) ,  the indifference curve is the appropriate 
segment of the convex combinations of (x,f(x) ) and (x,f (x) ) using weights 
(A4 ) a =  f (x ' )-y '  and 1 - a 
f(x' )-f(x' )  
1 _ f(x' ) -y' 
f (x ' )-f(x' )  
respectively; and (iii) for (x ' ,y ' ) ?: 0 and y '  � f (x ' ) ,  the indifference 
curve is the appropriate segment of the radial proj ections of (x,f(x) ) 
away from the origin in proportion 
(AS ) a =  
{y ' /f(x ' )  if x '  = 0 , y '  > · O  
x '  /x" otherwise ,  
where now x"  is  defined by f (x") /x" y' /x' if x' > 0 . 
I Finally, simply label each indifference curve wr· t� the
of its y-intercept . 
Establishing that the utility function so constnidted 
the requisite continuity, monotonicity and convexity proplJtlies 
routine matter . To begin with, observe that , given our plJtlicul 
choice of labelling for the indifference curves , in each l;jthe 
regions delineated by f and f the various definitions of A3)- l - - I I can be recast in terms of U, f(O) and f (O) . For instance ,  A4) 
equivalent to 
(A4 ' )  a = f (O)-U 
f (O)-f(O) 
and 1 - a = 1 - f (O)-U
f (0) -f(O) 
where U is related to (x' ,y ' ) implicitly by the equation 
(A6) y '  f (O)-U 
f (O)-i(O) 
f (x ' )  + (1 _ _ f (O)-U )· f (O)-f (O) f <xi' )' 
Following this lead through, it is easy to show that, Jj  eral l by t U is defined implicitly in terms of its indifference curves 
formulae 
(A7) y 
(U/!_(O) ) f {xf(O) /U) for x � 0 , !_(xf(O) /U) � 1o l tnd 
0 � U � f O)
( f ( o) -u ) - I � !CO)-U f (x)f (O)-!_(O) - . 
(f (OJ-UJf(x) + 
+ 1 - - f (x) for: x ;;:; . f (O)-f(O) 
i ' I(U-f(O) lf (x) � 0 and f (O) � � � f (  
(U/f(O ) )f (xf(O) /U) for x � 0 , - - ! [ f (xf (O) /U) ;;:; 0band I I 
f (0)  I - u. 
A-7 
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a 
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But by virtue of the specification of f and f, each of the functions 
on the righthand side of (A7) is differentiable , strictly decreasing 
in x ,  strictly increasing in U and strictly convex in x on its 
respective domain. Hence , the desired properties follow directly 
upon application of well-known, elementary results from functional 
analysis . 
Utilizing yet another simple reformulation of (A4) , it is 
also easy to verify the first additional property motivating this 
whole exercise -- that the offer curve originating at (x ,y) is vertical 
between (2_,y) and (x,y) . In particular, from (A6) we see that 
f (O)-U 
f(O)-.f.(O) 
y '-f (x ' )  
f(x ' ) -f (x' )  
f(x ' ) -y' 
f(x ' )-f(x ' )  
Thus, by fixing x'  = 2. = x (so that, as in Figure Al, .f.(x ' )  = .f.(2_) = y 
and f (x' )  = f(�) = y) , and considering only the nonnegative region
lying between the prespecified curves y = f (x) and y = f(x) for
x � O ,  the indifferences curves described in (A7) can equally well 
be described by 
(AB) y .. ,!-y' f(x) + (1 - !-y' ) f(x) for x � 0 ,  y � y' � y.y-y y-y 
Since the budget constraint 
v ' -v , _- - N yx' - 'x  , _-- "'--"- x + y = - L:1 x + y or y = Y + L:1 x 
x'-y x ' -y x ' -x x ' -x 
is identical to that obtained by taking the same convex combination of 
the two budget constraints described in (Al) , that is , 
y = 'Y::::L_ . -=-- + - x + 1 - .i'.::Y..:.. � + .Y::Y. x (-- ' ) (yx-yi y-y ) ( - ' ) (----; -_N )
y-y �-x 2_-x . y-.Y. x-x x-x 
Yx' -y' x y' -y + x, 
x ' -x x ' -x 
(AB) together with (A2) innnediately entail 
(A9) �-y' f(x) +.  ( 1  - �-y') f (x) {:} y-y y-.Y. 
x {:} x '  = x = � for, y � y ' � y,
rx'-y'x + L:::i x
x ' -X x ' -i 
I i which is the precise statement of the desired conclusion, shoi11n in 
The eec=d additional property - that the indi+�•=e 
curve passing through C.!.,y) lies strictly below (x*,y*) --
I
ds alr
guaranteed by the value restrictions on f, specifically, that 
.f.(.!.) = .Y. and .f.(x*) < y*, also shown in Figure Al .  
' ' '­There are two additional points r:lated to the flriEoin 
construction which merit at least passing connnent : (i) The same 
technique can be employed to justify the offer curve origiJa��ng 
(x,y) having a nonvertical linear segment, say, 
y 1 2 -a + bx for 0 < x � x � x < x, 
2_ - I ' provided , for instance, that b < T < o .  Since the details! of 
x -x 
such a construction are not especially material to any of qur1 pres 
obj ectives , we will not elaborate them here. 
(ii) The utility function implicitly defined by (A7) is not 
differentiable when either (x,y) = (x,.f.(x) } == o or cx,y) = I c:kl,£ (x)
-9 
gure Al . 
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Wayne Shafer has suggested an alternative procedure for defining a 
utility function which exhibits · all the same properties , but which is 
also both differentiable and homothetic . The essence of Wayne ' s  clever 
idea is displayed in Figure 2A, and in bare outline (i . e . , without any 
subtleties) goes as follows : Pick a function f : ·  {x : x � 1£} + R which 
yieids f (1£) = y and f ' (.!_) 
y-y 
= -- Next , extend this function leftward 
x-x 
from x = 1£ by solving the ordinary differential equation 
� (y/x)x-y 
dx = - for x ;:;; x x-x 
with initial condition y (.!_) = y; the solution is (no surprise) 
basically a power function 
Y = f (x) = � x + ( yx;Y.!.) ( � ) 
x 
x-x 
for x ;:;; x 
Finally, define the indifference curves as appropriate radial 
projections of (x,f (x) ) from 0 ,  and label them in some smooth, 
monotonic fashion, for instance ,  according to the y-coordinate of their 
intersection with the ray y = (y/.!_)x.  
Our particular algorithm has two advantages over Wayne ' s ,  
the first minor, the second not so minor. In the first place, it 
conveniently enables satisfying the additional dominance condition 
U (x*,y*) > U (2_,y) (or , more generally, satisfying various other 
additional restrictions on the indifference map) . 
In the second place, and more importantly, it can be used 
virtually unaltered to construct the sort of indifference map 
underlying the nonconvexity example described in Figure 11 . In fact, 
y 
(y' /x').l!. 
y ' 
z 
y 
f (x) for x Ii .l!. 
) d Cytx>.l!.-'Y (the solution · to � • � for x Ii .l!. with y (.J!.) 
\ 
-
.. ,t' offer curve 
(y' /x' )�y 
slope . !,-i 
x' .l!. i 
Figure A2. Construction of a Utility Function which Yields an 
Essentially Vertical Offer Curve and is both 
Differentiable and Homo the tic. 
f dt) for I 
x 
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.l!. 
the only significant change required is in the choice of f:  Given 
(x, y) > O such that x < x and Y-� = µ, f now needs simply be
2-x x-x 
specified , for instance, to be differentiable and to satisfy 
(AlO) f(x) {:} �-� + � x according as x {:} x or x ,  
x-x x-x 
as shown in Figure A3. (Compare with the second inequality in (A2) , 
A-12 
and its representation in Figure Al . )  Given such a specification, the 
earlier argument (where relevant) is identical down to the bottom 
line (A9) , which only need be slightly modified to correspond with (AlO) 
(A9 ' )  {""} - {""} - " - -. .  • x = x '  = x '." � (x = x or x) for y � y < y (y=y) • 
In other words,  the offer curve must now have the vertical 
segment with an upper endpoint discontinuity as depicted in Figure A3 . 
(A separate argument, not spelled out here, establishes that the offer 
curve in the nonnegative region lying strictly above the prespecified 
curve y = f (x) for x � 0 must have the single-valuedness property 
shown as well, provided that f is strictly convex on the interval 
[O,St] . )  
AIII.  Truncated Offer Curves 
It is worth briefly sketching an explicit procedure for 
Yx'-y'i y = ---
x '-i 
y 
y '  
z. 
y 
�-Yi ii y • --- + _ _  x 
i-i x-x 
y - �?�;. + z.-y 
.!_-x ,!_-i 
x 
i .!. • x' • x x 
Figure A3. Construction of a Utility Function which Yields 
obtaining the satiation example described in Figure 9 ;  an obvious I a Vertical Segment - with a Discontinuity at  its  Upper Endpoint - on the Offer Curve. 
elaboration then yields that described in Figure 8 .  Thus , again 
employing the neutral notation (x,y) , U and (x,y) , we show here that 
it is possible to construct a well-behaved utility function which 
achieves a global maximum at a consumption vector (x,y) such that
: !.fl:> + (i 
= lt<x> 
x 
A-13 
_ �)f(x) 
y-z. 
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x < i and - 1 < � < 0 .  Again, the basic nature o f  the constructionx-x 
is geometric , and can be completely captured in a diagram, as 
illustrated by Figure A4 . An algorithm for this particular construction 
runs as follows : Pick an ellipse lying wholly within the positive 
quadrant, say, f (x,y) = 0 .  Then, let 
x� = min {x : f (x,y) = 0 for some y > O}
and 
0 y = min {y : f (x ,y) = 0 for some x > O } ,  
00 0 with corresponding abscissa y and ordinate x , respectively, and let 
1 1 00 1 0 0 1 00 1 1 (x ,y ) be such that x < x < x , y < y < y , f(x ,y ) = 0 
y 
and Yo' 
1 1 1 1 (lf (x ,y ) I Clf (x ,y ) = _ 1 .  a x  oy 
(Refer to Figure A4 ; in this case the picture is surely much more 
informative than any accompanying algebra ! )  Next, pick any (x, y) such that 
1 - 0 0 - 1 (- �) 0 x < x < x , y < y < y and f x,y = , so that 
L < n ci:,y) I O f <i;y) < o - a x  Cl y  . ' 
and -- given (x,y) -- any (x,y) lying strictly inside f (x,y)
strictly below y = (y-x) - x, so that also 
1 < r-i < a f (x,y) I Clf (x,y) x-x a x  a y  
0 but 
Finally, once again define the indifference curves as radial projections , 
but here of the ellipse f (x ,y) = 0 from the point (x,y) , and label
them in some smooth, monotonic fashion, but here so that (x,y) has
y 
y1 
� 
,.., - 1 x x 
I
radial projections of 
f (x,y) • o from (x,y) 
i XO 
I 
Figure A4. Construction of a Utility Function which Yields 
Truncated Offer Curve . 
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the highest value, for ·instance ,  according to the lower y-coordinate 
of their intersection with the ray y = (y/x) x .  
Notice a couple o f  additional features o f  the utility function 
and endowment vector so constructed : (i) The corresponding offer 
curve will be backward bending (as drawn in Figures 8 and 9) if and 
only if 
i H (x,y) / a f (x,y) I > i-r ax ay (x,y) = (x, min' {y : f (x, y) = 0}) x-x 
(ii) The relationship between particular points on the corresponding off er 
curve and other stategically chosen points on the indifference map (as 
drawn, for instance, in Figure 8) can -- within limits -- be determined by 
suitably varying f ,  (x,y) and (x,y) .  
